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D.C. CIRCUIT BROADLY EXTENDS NEPA COVERAGE
FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ACCIDENTS
NUCLEAR POWER REGULATION-NEPA: The D.C. Circuit holds
that psychological health effects in the restart of a nuclear reactor
are recognized by NEPA and requires the Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission to evaluate these factors when assessing the safety of re-
starting the undamaged reactor at Three Mile Island, Pennsylvania.
People Against NuclearEnergy v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion, 678 F.2d 222 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
Editor's Note: While this casenote was at the printer, the Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals opinion in this case. The Supreme Court found that NEPA only required the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission to assess the environmental impact of its actions upon the physical envi-
ronment. "Although NEPA states its goals in sweeping terms of human health and welfare, these
goals are ends that Congress has chosen by means of protecting the physical environment." Met-
ropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, No. 81-2399 (together with No. 81-358,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission v. People Against Nuclear Energy), slip op. at 12 (April 19,
1983). Since the risk of a nuclear accident does not cause any measurable change in the environment,
the effect this risk may have on the psychological health of the neighboring residents is not cognizable
under NEPA.
INTRODUCTION
On March 28, 1979 Reactor Unit 2 (TMI-2) of the Three Mile Island,
Pennsylvania nuclear power plant (TMI) failed, causing "the worst nu-
clear accident Americans have yet experienced."' At the time of the
accident Unit 1 (TMI-1) was in cold shutdown for refueling. The Nuclear
Regulatory Commission ordered that TMI- 1 remain shutdown until the
Commission could conduct hearings to determine if the restart of Unit 1
would affect the health and safety of the nearby residents.
People Against Nuclear Energy (PANE), a group of TMI neighbors,
intervened in the Commission's restart hearings. They claimed that the
Commission should not allow the restart of TMI-1 without considering
the anxiety and mental stress suffered by the nearby residents as a result
of the TMI-2 accident.2 PANE claimed that the restart of TMI-1 would
aggravate the psychological stress suffered as a result of the TMI-2 nuclear
1. People Against Nuclear Energy v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 678 F.2d 222, 223 (D.C. Cir.
1982).
2. The Report of the President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island, The Need
for Change: The Legacy of TMI, at 35 (1979), found that the neighboring residents suffered mental
distress as a result of the TMI-2 accident.
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accident. Therefore, they wanted the Commission to include the mental
stress suffered by the neighbors of the nuclear plant as part of the Com-
mission's health and safety evaluation for restarting TMI-1. When the
Commission refused to include consideration of pscyhological health ef- o
fects in their assessment of the safety of restarting TMI-1, PANE peti-
tioned the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals to review this decision.
The Commission had limited its inquiry into the safety of restarting
TMI- 1 to the customary NEPA criteria;3 the effect of the activity on human
health and the environment. 4 PANE claimed that the National Environ-
mental Policy Act (NEPA)5 and the Atomic Energy Act6 required con-
sideration of psychological health effects as an element of human health
in studying the impact of projects that affect the environment. PANE also
claimed that the TMI-2 nuclear accident constituted "significant new
circumstances or information relevant to environmental concerns" that
require the Commission, under NEPA, to issue a supplemental environ-
mental impact statement before action significantly affecting the envi-
ronment can continue.7 According to PANE, the Commission's refusal
to do so violated NEPA and the Atomic Energy Act.
By a two to one vote, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission's decision to exclude assessment of the
psychological health effects of restarting TMI-1. The court found that
NEPA required consideration of psychological health factors while the
Atomic Energy Act did not. Although the Atomic Energy Act and NEPA
have similar goals, protection of the health and safety of the public, the
court limited the recognition of psychological health effects to NEPA.
The court did not explain why the Atomic Energy Act did not require
consideration of these factors. Presumably, the court remained silent with
regard to the Atomic Energy Act to avoid undue intrusion into atomic
energy development. In so doing the court protected the psychological
health of the neighboring residents without changing the implementation
requirements of the Atomic Energy Act.
The court delivered two opinions in response to PANE's petition. An
interim judgement announced on January 7, 1982 ordered the Commission
to comply with NEPA by assessing the environmental impact of the TMI-
1 restart on the neighboring residents' psychological health and the sur-
rounding community's well-being. From this assessment the Commission
would decide if a supplemental environmental impact statement was needed.
Until the Commission complied with NEPA by assessing these additional
3. 42 U.S.C. §4321 (1976).
4. Id. at §§4321, 4331(a).
5. Id. at §4321.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2133(b) (1976).
7. 40 C.FR. § 1502.9(c)(1) (1982).
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factors it was enjoined from making any decision about the restart of
TMI-1.
The court issued an amended judgement on April 2, 1982 upon dis-
covering that it did not have the power to order the Commission to assess
psychological health factors in restarting TMI-1. NEPA conferred this
power upon the Commission and not upon the court. According to NEPA,
federal regulatory agencies must prepare environmental impact statements
for federally assisted or regulated projects that significantly affect human
health or the environment. 8 After initial licensing, the federal agency
overseeing the project must prepare a supplemental environmental impact
statement if significant new circumstances or information relevant to
environmental concerns have arisen. 9 However, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission is given the discretion to determine if new circumstances or
information have arisen which are significant enough to require a reas-
sessment of the activity's environmental impact. 10 Upon realizing that
the Commission possessed the power to first determine if circumstances
or information had significantly changed regarding the potential psycho-
logical health effects of operating TMI-1, the court amended its decision
to allow the Commission to make this determination. The Commission
was also recognized as the proper decision-making body to formulate
procedures for making this determination.
The court also lifted the injunction prohibiting the Commission from
restarting TMI- 1 imposed by their interim judgement because of a guar-
anteed six to twelve month restart delay due to a corrosion problem. "
The court, however, required the Commission to give the court thirty
days notice if a restart decision was reached prior to complying with
NEPA. The court is thus able to reinvoke an injunction against the Com-
mission to force compliance with NEPA. The Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission appealed the circuit court's decision to the Supreme Court and
certiorari was granted on November 2, 1982. 12
DISCUSSION
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that NEPA recognized
psychological health as an element of overall human health. Therefore,
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission must assess psychological health
factors as a component of human health to determine if changes in a
8. 42 U.S.C. §4332(2)(C) (1976).
9. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c)(1) (1982).
10. See WATCH v. Harris, 603 F.2d 310, 317-18 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 995 (1979);
Asphalt Roofing Mfrs. Ass'n v. ICC, 567 F.2d 994, 1004 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Hanly v. Kleindienst,
471 F.2d 823, 828 (2d Cir. 1972).
11. New York Times, Feb. 11, 1982, at A18, col. 1.
12. 51 U.S.L.W. 3339 (U.S. Nov. 2, 1982)(No. 82-358).
April 19831
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federally regulated activity (e.g. nulcear energy production) affect human
health and thus require the preparation of a supplemental environmental
impact statement. The court arrived at this conclusion without building
a step-by-step legal argument. Instead, the court found that "in the wake
of a unique and traumatic nuclear accident"1 3 such as the TMI-I catas-
trophe, it was essential that NEPA recognize the impact of TMI-l 's restart
on the neighboring residents' psychological health. According to the Re-
port of the President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island,
the major health effect of the TMI-2 accident was its impact on the mental
health of the nearby residents. " In light of the severity of the TMI-2
accident and its potential hazard to the psychological health of local
residents, the court concluded that NEPA, a congressional mandate to
safeguard human health, required the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
to evaluate psychological health factors in determining the safety of re-
starting the TMI- 1 nuclear reactor.
NEPA was enacted to safeguard the health and welfare of man15 from
new and continuing federally regulated activities. 16 The Commission's
continued regulation of the Three Mile Island nuclear plant forced the
facility to comply with the NEPA objectives of attaining maximum ben-
eficial use of the environment without risking human health and safety. 17
Since the court viewed the TMI-2 accident as severely affecting the nearby
residents' psychological health, it ordered the Commission to recognize
these adverse effects as possibly changing the circumstances of operating
the nuclear power plant. While the court could not, consistent with NEPA,
order a formal assessment of psychological health effects, as evidenced
by the court's retreat from its interim judgement, it did require the Com-
mission to take these factors into account when deciding if significant
new circumstances or information had arisen concerning the TMI project.
The court supported its decision by pointing to the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission's own doubts about the safety of restarting TMI-1. The
Commission ordered the delay of the TMI-1 restart'" because it lacked
"the requisite reasonable assurance that the . . . Unit No. 1 facility . . .
can be operated without endangering the health and safety of the pub-
lic. "'9 The Commission's uncertainty about the safety of the restart added
weight to the court's finding that the potentially catastrophic nature of
the nuclear accident required special attention to all possible adverse
13. 678 F.2d at 229.
14. Report of the President's Commission, supra note 2, at 35.
15. 42 U.S.C. §4321 (1976).
16. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18(a) (1981).
17. 42 U.S.C. §4331(b) (1976).
18. 44 Fed. Reg. 40461 (1979).
19. 678 F.2d at 232.
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health effects, including psychological health effects possibly enhanced
by the restart of TMI-1.
The court disposed of cases cited by the Commission rejecting the
cognizability of psychological health factors by NEPA by distinguishing
the TMI-2 accident as unique, severe and potentially extremely damaging
to physical human health. The court decided that the severity of the nuclear
accident required the evaluation of the effects of the TMI-1 restart on
psychological health notwithstanding the rejection of this doctrine by
other courts. Thus, the court distinguished the TMI-2 accident from sit-
uations such as a community's fear that its character would be changed
by low income housing20 or that crime would increase due to the location
of a detention center near a residential 2' neighborhood. This distinction
can be critized. The TMI-2 accident was catastrophic but the accident's
adverse effects 22 on the psychological health of the nearby residents were
short lived. 23 However, the detrimental psychological health effects of
the fear of crime from a detention center located in the neighborhood or
the physical deterioration of a neighborhood due to low income housing
projects are arguably more long lasting because they result in continuing
psychological stress to the local residents. The court in PANE did not
assess the duration of the harm. Instead, it focused on the immediate
severity of the psychological harm caused by the TMI-2 accident. There-
fore, the court's decision in this case is solely justified by its conclusion
that the TMI-2 accident was unique and potentially extremely harmful to
human health.
Although the Supreme Court will probably discuss this weakness in
its review of the D.C. Circuit's opinion, PANE can amplify its argument
and make use of the long lasting ill effects of the nuclear accident. PANE
can argue that the possibility of another nuclear accident at Three Mile
Island looms so great in the minds of the nearby residents that TMI-1
should never be restarted. At this point the Supreme Court will have to
weigh the harm to the residents' psychological health if TMI-1 is restarted
against the stifling effect upon nuclear energy development if TMI-1 is
permanently shut down. The Court may be hesitant to so greatly impede
nuclear energy development based on psychological health effects that
are not easily quantifiable. Before the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, the
Commission argued that psychological health effects were unquantifiable,
and therefore, they could not be properly assessed under NEPA. However,
20. Nucleus of Chicago Homeowner's Ass'n v. Lynn, 524 F.2d 225, 231 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 967 (1976).
21. 471 F.2d at 833 n.10.
22. There were little or no discernible physical health effects as a result of the TMI-2 accident.
Report of the President's Commission, supra note 2, at 34-35.
23. Id.
April 1983]
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the court refused to allow this argument defeat their desired result. It did
not rule that psychological factors were quantifiable, but instead stated
that the Commission cannot ignore psychological factors on that basis.
Under NEPA, federal regulatory agencies must attempt to develop meth-
ods of weighing unquantifiable environmental factors so that they are
given consideration in the decision-making process.24 The circuit court's
decision that these factors must be assessed despite their unquantifiability
supports its position that the TMI-2 accident requires special scrutiny of
the environmental effects of the TMI operation.
DISSENTING OPINIONS
There was a marked difference of opinion among the court's three-
member panel concerning the recognition of psychological health effects
by NEPA and the Atomic Energy Act. Justice Wilkey found that NEPA
did not recognize psychological health factors while Justice Wright wished
to extend the recognition of these factors to the Atomic Energy Act as
well.
In his dissent Justice Wilkey concluded that NEPA did not encompass
the psychological health effects of operating a nuclear power plant. He
supported his position by pointing to NEPA's lack of express language
about the subject, the denial of recognition of these factors under NEPA
by other courts, and the unquantifiability of psychological health effects.
He looked at the end result of the extension of NEPA coverage to the
unique situation produced by the TMI-2 accident and concluded that
assessment of these factors by NEPA could act as a major roadblock in
developing nuclear energy. Justice Wilkey stated that NEPA's recognition
of psychological health effects was synonymous with allowing the public
to express their opinions about nuclear energy and in effect overrule
Congress' decision to permit nuclear energy development. Justice Wilkey
hypothesized that special interest groups could stir up hysteria about
incidents similar to the TMI-2 accident and thereby invalidate Congress'
authority to authorize nuclear energy development.
Justice Wilkey's dissent followed an analysis similar to the court's
majority by focusing on the end result of extending NEPA to cover
psychological health. However, he relied on the importance of following
congressional mandate to promote the development of nuclear energy
production, while the majority based its conclusion on the severity of the
TMI-2 accident. Thus, the judges arrived at their opposite conclusions
because of a difference of opinion about the importance of forestalling
the restart of TMI-1 and basic differences in philosophy about nuclear
24. 42 U.S.C. §4332(2)(B) (1976).
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power. The majority placed importance on the broad mandate of NEPA
to safeguard human health while Justice Wilkey looked to the possible
frustration of nuclear energy development if NEPA was extended to these
types of situations.
On the other hand, Justice Wright urged in his dissent that the Atomic
Energy Act also recognized psychological health factors. Like NEPA, the
Atomic Energy Act is charged with protecting the health and safety of
the public from nuclear energy development. Under the Atomic Energy
Act the Commission would not issue licenses when it "would be inimical
• . . to the health and safety of the public." 25 Justice Wright found no
good reason for refusing to extend the Atomic Energy Act to the present
situation. The majority claimed that such an extension would divert the
Act's focus from its primary goal of ensuring the technical safety of
operational nuclear reactors. Justice Wright was unconvinced by this
rationale because the objectives of NEPA and the Atomic Energy Act to
protect the health and safety of the public are so similar.26
CONCLUSION
The majority's opinion provides a new way for groups to protect their
health and the health of others from the potential injuries resulting from
nuclear accidents. Never before has psychological health been recognized
as an important element of human health subject to protection under
NEPA. The court's emphasis on safeguarding psychological health was
shaped by sensational news reporting that generated fear of nuclear power
as well as by each judge's own opinion about the merits of nuclear energy
development.
This decision will undeniably change the character of environmental
impact assessments of nuclear energy development unless it is reversed
by the Supreme Court. According to the D.C. Cirucuit Court of Appeals,
NEPA now requires complete evaluation of all aspects of human health
affected by nuclear development, including psychological health. The
Supreme Court may not agree with the circuit court's conclusion that the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission must pay special attention to psycho-
logical health effects from nuclear accidents because this extension of
NEPA may become a major new tool for slowing the development of
nuclear energy production. Justice Wilkey noted four instances where
anti-nuclear groups have used the interim judgement in PANE to petition
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to impede the licensing of new nu-
clear power plants. These anti-nuclear groups claim that according to
25. 42 U.S.C. § 2133(d) (1976).
26. 42 U.S.C. §4321 (1976); 42 U.S.C. § 2133(d) (1976).
April 1983]
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PANE psychological health effects must be assessed as part of environ-
mental impact statements.27 Whether the Commission and the appellate
courts will accept this attempted extension of PANE to the initial licensing
of nuclear power plants is not known. The Supreme Court will undoubt-
edly consider the anti-nuclear groups attempted use of the D.C. Circuit's
opinion and the Commission's reaction to this use when assessing PANE's
impact upon nuclear energy development. Use of the PANE decision to
interfere with initial licensing procedures for new nuclear power plants
will weigh heavily upon the Supreme Court if the Court favors unen-
cumbered nuclear energy development. However, the Supreme Court and
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals must agree that nuclear energy de-
velopment stands alone as an extremely volatile endeavor and that any
decision by the Court will have a weighty impact on nuclear energy
development.
SUSAN B. RUSH
27. 678 F.2d at 248.
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